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This paper analyses the feasibility of a monetary union within the Mercosur, focusing on cycle 
synchronicity. Three questions are addressed, concerning respectively the features of shocks hitting 
each member, the impact of exchange rate regime differences on countries’ responses and the share of 
common and idiosyncratic components in shocks and policy responses.  Shocks are identified through 
identical country-VARs. This paper concludes that there exists a weak cycle synchronization, due to 
asymmetric shocks and divergences in policy responses.  The endogenous approach in OCA theory 
can advise the adoption of a common nominal anchor, in order to speed up convergence. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Common market of the South (Mercosur) was created in 1991 by the Treaty of Asuncion signed 
between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. At the beginning the formal project was just a free 
trade agreement. During the 90s, the signatory countries envisaged a more ambitious economic and 
monetary process of integration. Then, an institutional framework promoting economic policy 
coordination was gradually set up. In 2000, the Treaty of Ouro Preto established a permanent structure 
dedicated to this coordination. Targets and procedures intended to allow the convergence of public 
deficit and the debt ratio were defined. A high-level macroeconomic Group of surveillance equivalent 
to the Ecofin council in the European Union was created.  
During the 90s, Mercosur countries have been hit by successive regional and international shocks such 
as the Mexican (1994), Asian (1997), Russian (1998), Brazilian (1999) and Argentina (2001-2002) 
crises. These shocks strongly increased the volatility of  macroeconomic variables. Paradoxically, 
despite the fact that the integration process suggests that policy coordination is the most efficient 
response to financial mayhem, economies gave priority to national concerns, weakening the economic 
and institutional links embodied in the Asuncion Treaty. 
This evolution raises the question of the feasibility of a regional monetary union between the 
Mercosur countries
3
. The purpose of this study is to bring some elements of answer. Contrary to the 
basic optimal currency areas (OCA) literature which proposes a costs-benefit analysis of a monetary 
union
4
, our approach is exclusively based on the business cycles properties of the Mercosur countries. 
Our analysis focuses on business cycle synchronicity across countries, on the propagation mechanisms 
of shocks, and on their common and specific components. 
A large body of empirical research focusing on the cyclical properties of Mercosur countries has been 
published. A first strand of literature uses different specifications to decompose cycles in specific and 
common components (Loayza, Lopez, and Ubide (1999); Karras (2003)). The main conclusion of this 
literature is that contrary to East Asian countries, Mercosur is not an OCA. A second strand of 
literature takes into account a larger macroeconomic framework with VAR or VECM models 
(Hallwood, Marsh, and Scheibe (2004); Fanelli and González-Rozada (2003); and Ahmed (2003)). 
The results of these studies exhibit low correlation of shock-disturbances not only inside the Mercosur 
zone, but also between Mercosur countries and the United States. A monetary union or a common peg 
to the dollar (dollarization) are not viable solution. 
Our paper differs from the previous literature on several points. First, our analysis focuses on the 
period following the creation of Mercosur. Indeed, not only the quality of data for long periods is low 
                                               
3
. For date availability reasons, our study covers only three countries: Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. 
4
. See, for instance: Eichengreen (1998), Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000), Larrain and Tavares (2003), 
Eichengreen and Taylor (2004), and Alesina, Barro, and Tenreyro (2003). 
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in emerging countries, but also, during the 80s, the three economies were very unstable, mainly due to 
the debt crisis and the bouts of hyperinflation: such disturbances make data processing very complex 
and unstable. So, our study begins in 1991 by taking into account more stabilized economies. Our 
approach of currency unions being based on business cycle dynamics, we use quarterly data, only 
available and comparable since 1990 for the three countries. As a result, the paper uses quarterly 
frequency for the period 1991-Q1-2006-Q1. Second, we build VAR models for each economy 
including more macroeconomic variables than previous studies. In comparison with studies  
decomposing shocks only into their specific and common components, we are able to identify the 
nature of disturbances hitting these countries. Contrary to bivariate VAR models, we take into account 
more diverse shocks such as external and domestic disturbances, but also policy shocks. Finally, we 
propose to break down structural innovations of domestic semi-structural VARs into unobservable 
common and idiosyncratic components using a state-space model (Harvey, 1990). These models 
respond to the drawbacks of the previous literature, of which the quasi-totality concentrates on the 
correlation of shocks without disaggregating the shocks into specific common and components 
constituent in every country. These results are used to check evidence of economic synchronicity, and 
convergence of macroeconomic policy. 
Three questions linked to the feasibility of a currency union in Mercosur are addressed. First, what 
kinds of shocks –real or nominal, external or domestic- produce higher fluctuations in the three 
countries? If major shocks differ between countries, policy responses would probably limit the 
sustainability of any monetary union. Second, to what extent has the adoption of different exchange 
rate regimes affected the countries’ reactions to disturbances? In other words, is the diversity of 
exchange rate regimes inside the area an obstacle to macroeconomic policy convergence? Different 
adjustments to similar external and/or domestic shocks give indications of the degree of convergence 
between Mercosur countries. Third, what is the respective share of common and specific components 
of disturbances in the studied countries? Weak common components imply large exchange rate 
adjustments decreasing the feasibility of a currency union. They result either from the existence of 
asymmetric shocks across countries or from the absence of macroeconomic policy coordination. 
Several interesting facts emerge from our analysis. First, cross-correlations show a weak synchronicity 
of cycles which can be explained by the presence of asymmetric shocks and/or different economic 
policy responses to shocks. Such a result is observed not only for the synchronicity of cycles between 
each country and the United States, but also between the countries themselves. Second, the VARs 
confirm the weak convergence of the economic policies between these countries identified in other 
studies. While these countries seem all to be hit essentially by nominal shocks, the adjustments are 
different. This result rests on the fact Mercosur countries adopted different exchange rate regimes 
during the 90s: hard peg for Argentina and intermediate regimes for Brazil and Uruguay. Different 
adjustments to similar shocks suggest that the diversity of the exchange rate regimes inside the area is 
 4 
one of the main impediments to the convergence of economic policy. Third, despite different exchange 
rate regimes, our three countries share a similar behavior: fear of floating. Indeed, the VARs show that 
domestic interest rates don’t significantly react to external and domestic real shocks. Even in countries 
with a soft peg, the nominal anchor exerts a constraint on the monetary policy. Fear of floating means 
here a fear of inflation. Finally, our state-space model shows the weak common component of shocks 
representing economic policies. It implies not only a weak convergence of economic policies, but also 
a low degree of coordination within the area. Indeed, we take into account economic policy shocks. 
Overall, our results converge to indicate that the Mercosur countries are not predisposed to form a 
monetary union either between them, or with the United States. 
The policy implications of the results are the following. The Mercosur area adopted an institutional 
framework dedicated to the promotion of coordination between member countries. Our results suggest 
that this initial target is far from reached. The lack of a common anchor is one of the main causes of 
this fact. Indeed, it appears from our VARs that the nature of shocks is not significantly different 
between countries. So, to favor an economic policy convergence, it seems important that Mercosur 
countries adopt a similar anchor. Shock asymmetry between the Mercosur area and the United States 
implies that the US dollar is not a good candidate. Trade diversity from a geographic point of view 
suggests that a peg to a common currency basket would be a solution. An alternative solution, 
suggested for instance by Rose (2006), would be for Mercosur countries to adopt a similar inflation 
target in the conduct of their monetary policy. 
The remainder of this paper is organized in five sections. Section two presents and analyzes business 
cycles in Mercosur. Cross-correlations are used to bring to light evidence of propagation mechanisms 
and comovements. Section three presents the outcomes of the estimates of a VAR model for each 
economy; it identifies the interdependence between domestic macroeconomic variables, and with 
external ones, and the sources of disturbances. Section four proposes to break down structural 
innovations of domestic VAR into unobservable common and idiosyncratic components using a state-
space model. Section five concludes. 
 
2. CYCLICAL COMOVEMENTS IN MERCOSUR: SOME EVIDENCE ON EMPIRICAL 
REGULARITIES. 
 
To investigate the issues of business cycle synchronicity and propagation mechanisms of shocks we 
will begin the study by identifying some stylized facts relative to the three main partners of the 
Mercosur, and the United States.  
Reporting in Table 2.1 the average quarterly Industrial Production Index (IPI) growth rate of the three 
countries from 1991Q1 to 2005Q3, we can draw a first conclusion about the dynamic of Mercosur 
countries for the period. 
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Table 2.1 Quarterly IPI Growth and Volatility (average quarterly growth rate in percentage from 
1991:1 to 2005:3) 
 Argentina Brazil  Uruguay  
 Mean 0.003837 0.005532 0.000687 
 Median 0.008998 0.008397 -0.004677 
 Maximum 0.069170 0.078137 0.161532 
 Minimum -0.146305 -0.109355 -0.147168 
 Std. Dev. 0.037041 0.032248 0.062580 
Source: author’s calculations using  the IMF data base. 
As a whole, average growth rates are very low. Brazil exhibits the highest growth rate with the lowest 
volatility; at the opposite, the Uruguayan IPI growth rate is both low and volatile. The wide gap 
between the observed maximum and minimum values of the growth rate reveals a high degree of 
instability. To conclude, real volatility is fairly high for the three countries (but it is the case of 
emerging countries in general, and of the Latin American ones in particular). 
 
Stationarity and Cointegration Investigation 
 
We begin by checking - for each country - the stationarity of interest rates, and of the logarithm of all 
the other variables
5
. Standard Augmented Dickey Fuller tests are largely perturbed by numerous 
shocks, periods of high inflation, stabilization programs, and changes in monetary, currency, or fiscal 
regimes. But even after correction of structural breaks (Perron, 1989), all data are I(1), except interest 
rates, which are apparently I(0). Finally, tests of cointegration (Johansen) failed to find any 
cointegrating vector
6
. Anyway, given the size of our data set, tests for inflation and cointegration are 
likely to have low power: we therefore followed economic theory to guide our choices. 
To stationarize the I(1) series, we use two detrending methods: 
1) The first differentiation of the logarithm of variables; 
2) The decomposition trend/cycles by an HP filter. In this latter case, we had to choose values of 
lambda. Investigating business cycles in developing countries, Agenor, McDermott, and 
Prasad (2000) assess cycle length to be between two and four years. In another study, Rand 
and Tarp (2002) confirm that the usual length for industrialized countries -between 24 and 32 
quarters– is not relevant for emerging markets: the duration of business cycle is clearly 
shorter, between 7.7 to 12 quarters. So, we deduce a lambda of 1600 for the United States and 
400 for our emerging economies.  
                                               
5
. Our model contains eight variables: World Oil Price, US Industrial Production Index, Fed Funds Interest 
Rate, and for each Mercosur country: Industrial Production Index, Price Production Index, Money Market 
Interest Rate, Monetary Aggregate M2, and the Real Exchange Rate. All the data are quarterly and come from 
the International Financial Statistics of the IMF. For a detailed analysis of these variables, see our VAR model 
below. 
6
. All the tests are available upon request to the authors. 
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In the following section, we just present the conclusions inferred from the times series detrended by  
the HP filter
7
.  
 
Cycles and Synchronicity in  the Mercosur Area 
 
We measure the degree of business cycle co-movement of quarterly IPI growth by pairs of countries. 
We will mainly focus on the magnitude of cycle synchronicity in the OCA perspective, looking at the 
cross-correlation of conjuncture between the three LA countries, and between them and the United 
States. For each LA country, we also computed the cross-correlation between a set of key 
macroeconomic variables. We only consider here results from the  IPI cross-correlations
8
. 
Following Agenor, McDermott and Prasad (2000), we measure the degree of co-movement between 
two stationary components y
t
 and x
t
, derived from our series using the same H.P. filter, by the 
magnitude of the correlation coefficient ( ) { }, 0, 1, 2,...j j∆ ∈ ± ± . We will consider the series “yt” 
and “x
t
” to be procyclic, acyclic, or countercyclic if the contemporaneous correlation ( )0∆  is 
positive, zero, or negative, respectively. In addition, we deem the series to be strongly correlated if 
( )0,27 0,27j≤ ∆ ≤ , weakly correlated if ( )0,13 0,13j≤ ∆ ≤ , and uncorrelated in the other 
cases
9
. We say that y
t
 leads the cycle by “j” periods if ( )j∆  is a maximum for a positive “j”, is 
synchronous with the cycle if j=0, and lags the cycle if ( )j∆ is a maximum for negative j. 
We distinguish the cycles with the United States on one side, and the cycles between the Mercosur 
countries on the other side. 
 
Cross-correlations Between the United States and the Mercosur Countries 
 
Figure 2.1 exhibits business cycles estimated with the HP filter for the United States and our three 
emerging countries. 
                                               
7
 A similar analysis carried out with log differenced data, but not presented here, leads to the same conclusion.  
8
. Results concerning Price Production Index and Real Exchange Rates are available from the authors. 
9
. The approximate standard error of these correlation coefficients, computed under the null hypothesis that the 
true correlation coefficient is zero and given a number of observations per country in the sample, is about 13,5. 
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Figure 2.1 Cycles in the United States, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay 
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NB: the prefix "h" and the suffix "c" indicate that the matter is about cycles stemming from the filtered 
(by HP) IPI. Letters A, B, U, US, indicate the three countries of Mercosur and the United States 
respectively. 
Source: authors’ calculations using the IMF datebase. 
The figure confirms country specific periodicities, (not fundamentally modified by the choice of the 
value of lambda). Peaks and troughs of the Mercosur countries correspond to peaks and troughs of the 
US, but the difference of frequency involves a higher number of fluctuations in the first group of 
countries. Indeed, these are subject to numerous shocks increasing their macroeconomic volatility. 
Thus, the lagged correlations lose a part of their meaning as driving forces. The contemporaneous 
cross-correlations, presented in appendix 1, show very significant links between the United States on 
one side, and Argentina and Uruguay on the other side  (0.39 in both cases) and  a lesser influence of 
the American cycles on Brazil ( 0.27 ). We thus have here a first illustration of the greater autonomy 
of this economy, as will be confirmed below. 
In terms of the relevance of a dollar area with the United States, we can thus conclude that the 
conditions are not fulfilled. The three Mercosur countries and the United States do not form an optimal 
currency area. 
 
Cross-correlations Between the Mercosur Countries 
 
As reported in appendix 1, the cross-correlations are sharply less significant than the ones computed 
for the countries of the European Union and for the various states of the United States. However, the 
correlation between the cycles of our three countries is not nil. Indeed, the contemporaneous 
correlations are significant except within Brazil and Uruguay. The lagged correlations confirm a 
common cycle with a three year periodicity for Argentina and Brazil: so, the figure in appendix 1 
exhibits a fairly significant negative cross-correlation for six quarters, and again a strong positive 
correlation for twelve / thirteen quarters. At least, the Argentina cycle precedes the Uruguayan one. 
 
 8 
This set of outcomes could suggest country specific periodicity of cycles. The gap with the U.S. 
conjuncture is striking, with no hints of any co-movement. In the Mercosur area, our analysis exhibits 
some evidence of cycle synchronicity. The following experiments will deepen these results.  
 
 3. MODELING DOMESTIC CYCLES AND PROPAGATION MECHANISMS 
 
Literature on regional integration and OCAs stresses the identification of common shocks, the degree 
of similarity in the adjustment process of the candidates and the convergence of policy responses to 
shocks. This section aims at deepening these points. In the context of strong links of macroeconomic 
variables with complex feed back linkages, VAR approach constitutes a useful tool: it allows the 
assessment of the consequences of structural (orthogonal) shocks on endogenous external and policy 
variables. VARs are “a-theoretical”: the usual way to introduce theory passes through the inclusion of 
restrictions in the structural VARs (SVARs), leading to specific predictions relative to the time path of 
endogenous variables as consequences of  shocks.  It can also pass through  the Cholesky ordering 
used to orthogonalize the impulses (this kind of  “half” structural VAR is sometimes called recursive 
Var or RVAR). In this paper, the choice of a simple VAR in differences is made, due to the lack of 
cointegration vectors (any other solution would lead to greater forecast errors, as showed Allen, and 
Fildes, 2004). 
 
Variable selection 
 
Our choice of variables is the traditional one for VARs analyzing external shocks, and macroeconomic 
packages in open economies (Favero, 2001, Lütkepohl, & Krätzig, 2004). For the external variables, 
we chose the World Oil Price (noted WOP), the US Industrial Production Index (US_IPI) and the US 
Federal Funds Rate (US_R), a way to account for the main real supply and financial shocks. For the 
domestic variables (for each country «i”, I= A, B, U) , we took Industrial Production Index (i_IPI), 
Producer Prices Index (i_PPI), Money Market Interest Rate (i_R), Money Aggregate (i_M2), and Real 
Exchange Rate (i_R).  
One of the first characteristic of this model is to build an identical VAR for each of our three 
economies, building-in the same elementary three variables US model  (including: World Oil Price, 
US IPI, and US Federal Funds Rate). We chose this option instead of adding external variables as 
purely exogenous to underline the interaction between these three variables in each of our national 
models. Thus, each national VAR is an 8 variables model, with 3 external variables and 5 domestic 
variables. 
As usual in the literature, we suppose that structural (orthogonal) shocks are linear combinations of the 
residuals in the reduced form VAR models. The identification of the structural shocks of interest is 
carried out using contemporaneous restrictions based on the Choleski ordering of a recursive 
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economic structure (with the most exogenous variable ordered first, i.e. here the external variables: 
International Oil Price, US Product Index, and Federal Funds Rate). It means that contrary to 
numerous similar works, we do not apply the “BQ” decomposition identification procedure 
(Blanchard, and Quah, 1989). Assuming a long term neutrality of nominal shocks would seem widely 
arbitrary for a work covering about twelve or so years, even if business cycles are – as shown above - 
shorter for these countries than for industrialized ones.  In fine, the ordering follows the following 
order: World Oil Price, US IPI, US Federal Funds Rate, Domestic IPI, Domestic PPI, Domestic 
Interest Rate, Domestic Money Aggregate, and Real Exchange Rate, with a just identified scheme: 
contrary to Kim,  and Roubini, 1997, we consider here domestic the interest rate as more exogenous 
than money demand (in their paper, both authors proposed an over-identified model, with a 
simultaneous feedback between money demand and the central bank rule).  
Then, we deduce (orthogonal) structural innovations from  the residuals of the reduced form VAR, 
using an identification restriction scheme (presented above). They are used to perform impulse 
response experiments and variance decomposition analysis of forecast errors. Finally, a state-space 
model will carry out a decomposition of structural shocks to extract the eventual common component. 
 
The model 
 
The first step was to estimate our VAR (in first differences of logarithms) for the three countries. The 
number of lags in each was selected using the common set of criteria and tests (available on the 
software Eviews).  In presence of contradictory results, we followed the parsimony principle and 
chose the shorter lag (one lag for every country case). For each country “i”, the standard (reduced) 
form of our VAR with constant is the following :  
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In order to account for specific country shocks during the period, we added dummies: 
- for Brazil, from 1990Q1 to 1994Q2, i.e. for the period of accelerated inflation, up to the Real 
Stabilization Plan,  
- for Uruguay, from 2001Q3 to 2003Q1, a period perturbed by Argentinean and Brazilian 
instability.  
 10 
Tests for a dummy variable for the Argentinean Currency Board crisis did not reveal a significant 
effect. Therefore, we did not keep it in our model. 
 
One has to keep in mind that our three economies have adopted different exchange rate regimes. These 
regimes have subsequently evolved, following independent paths for the period! We sum up this 
evolution: 
- from 1991 to 2001, Argentina adopted a currency board (hard peg), then an independent 
regime of floating; 
- from 1991 to 1997, Brazil adopted a crawling band regime (a kind of Real Exchange Rate 
targeting) more or less “de jure” and more or less narrow, according to the context. After the 
strong currency crisis, in January 1999, Brazil implemented a flexible exchange rate regime 
combined with inflation targeting.  
- From 1991 to 2001, Uruguay adopted a crawling band, substituted in June 2002 by a flotation 
regime. 
 
Results 
We account for various kinds of shocks: 
1) two external real shocks: the World Oil Price as an international shock, and the U.S. Industrial 
Production Index as a regional shock; 
- one domestic real shock with the Industrial Production Index compiled for each Mercosur country; 
- four domestic nominal shocks including the production price index, Money Market Interest Rates, 
the monetary aggregate M2 and the Real Exchange Rate. As the real and nominal exchange rates 
produce similar effects on countries, we classify the first ones as nominal shocks
10
. 
In addition, over the studied period, the Real Exchange Rate is strongly determined by the evolution of 
production prices. Nominal interest rates and Real Exchange Rates are our policy variables. As in 
Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), M2 represents here the money demand (we do not consider it as a 
policy instrument).  In spite of this assumption, responses of M2 to shocks remain difficult to interpret 
for the following reasons: 
- in some cases (for instance, Brazil), this aggregate includes liquid public debts. As a result, 
the behavior of M2 does not necessarily follow a transactional logic; 
- changes in M2 are partly linked to the dollarization of countries. More exactly, it is advisable 
to take into account the fact that the degree of dollarization is not the same among the studied 
countries, and that this monetary aggregate eventually builds deposits in foreign currencies. Let us 
clarify this point. 
                                               
10
. This observation is also valid for industrial countries. See Favero (2000). 
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Using the classification proposed by Reinhart, Rogoff and Savastano (2003), Argentina and Brazil 
belong to Type I dollarization –in which domestic and external liability dollarization co-exist- while 
Uruguay is a dollarized economy of Type II where dollarization is predominantly of a domestic nature. 
The degree of dollarization is different between these countries: high in Argentina (index 20 on a scale 
of 0 to 30) and Uruguay (21), but moderate in Brazil (7). By reporting the share of foreign deposits in 
percentage of total deposits, Table 3.1 confirms these facts.  
 
 
 
Table 3.1 Foreign Currency Denominated Deposits (in percent of total deposits) 
 1990 2001 2004 
Argentina 47.2 71.5 10.7* 
Brazil 0.0 6.1 6.5 
Uruguay 88.6 83.0 83.0 
* the decrease results from the forced “pesification”
11
 of the economy after the exchange rate crisis in 
January 2002. 
Source : Rennhack and Nozaki (2006). 
 
Finally, we observe that in Argentina, M2 includes some deposits in dollars, in opposition with Brazil 
and Uruguay. In the Brazilian case it is not really important given the moderate degree of dollarization 
of the economy. But it is not the same for Uruguay; in this country, we observe that the demand for 
money measured by M2 does not respond exclusively to the traditional factors in monetary theory: it 
also depends on (external and domestic) events influencing the confidence in the domestic currency. 
For instance, during the Argentina crisis, the M3 growth (which includes dollars deposits) balanced 
the M2 decrease in Uruguay, as consequence of a greater dollarization of the economy. Indeed, the 
Argentinean crisis casts doubt on the sustainability of the exchange rate regime in Uruguay
12
. 
 
External Real Shocks: Responses of Domestic Variables 
 
The observation of IPI responses to WOP and US_IPI shocks shows a prevailing short term impact 
(about one-two quarters), with fluctuations of small magnitude. For instance, following a WOP shock, 
we observe an increase in the growth rate of  the IPI for producers of gas and oil (Argentina and 
Brazil), and a limited drop in Uruguay. However, in every case, the equilibrium is restored within one 
year. Variance decomposition confirms these results. Innovations on WOP or the US_IPI never 
explain more than 10% of the variance of the IPI for our sample of three countries. 
                                               
11
 adoption of “peso”, the Argentinean Currency, as single domestic currency after the Currency Board Regime 
with official bi-monetarism (and the possibility to own deposit in both pesos and dollars)  
12
. The exchange rate regime of Uruguay collapsed in June 2002. The country adopted a floating regime. 
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In the three countries, a WOP shock leads to a price increase, either on impact, or at the end of the first 
quarter. The adjustment of production prices is quite fast in the three countries. The shock is indeed 
absorbed after five – six quarters. The price fluctuations are particularly significant in Argentina. The 
monetary regime reduces the smooth adjustments of the economy to shocks. As a consequence, either 
the adjustments are fast, but costly in terms of short-run instability, or on the contrary they are very 
slow and painful. 
The short-term price increase following a shock on US_IPI is in accordance with the expected effects. 
The similarity of the effects with the shock on WOP does not mean that transmission mechanisms are 
identical. Higher oil prices increase production costs, while the supply increase due to the shock on 
US_IPI entails a price increase of raw materials, and possibly wage costs, with an impact on the PPI. 
We find again differences as far as the size of the fluctuations is concerned. Argentinean prices react 
very strongly while Uruguayan prices very little. The two main economies of our sample have a 
significant price decrease after three quarters in Argentina and six in Brazil. Variance decompositions 
confirm the previous results. The innovations on US_IPI explain a significant share of  price variance 
in Argentina and Uruguay, but not in Brazil. 
The interest rate reactions to previous shocks are not very significant. The interpretation can be the 
following: whatever the exchange rate regime, the room for maneuver of monetary policies was weak 
for the main part of the period. Indeed, in the three countries, the interest rate was used to enforce the 
nominal anchor (where the exchange rate appears every time) in a context of disinflation policies. The 
counter-cyclical responses to shocks are thus limited. This analysis seems to be confirmed by the 
variance decompositions: none of the external real variables exerts any influence on the interest rates, 
except Uruguay with the US_IPI. The innovations on this variable explain 15% of the variance of 
U_PPI after twelve quarters.  
For the three countries, the responses of M2 to real external shocks are either not significant, or of very 
short term, with the exception of Uruguay. We find the weak influence of the external variables in the 
analysis of the variance decompositions. The innovations on the American production explain between 
10 and 16% of the variance of the Uruguayan monetary aggregate. Neither the innovations on WOP, 
nor those on the US_IPI, explain the variance of M2 in the two other countries. 
In the three countries, the effects of real external shocks on the Real Exchange Rates are weak and 
short. 
 
External Nominal Shock: Response of Domestic Real and Nominal Variables 
 
The US interest rate shocks are interpreted as monetary policy ones. After one quarter, output falls 
slightly following the monetary contraction in the United States. Prices do not show significant 
responses. Interest rates increase in Brazil and in Uruguay (which seems in accordance with the 
traditional financial links), but decrease in Argentina. However, this effect is a very short-lived one 
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(less than one quarter) and according to common knowledge about the functioning of currency boards, 
interest rates adjust very quickly in Argentina. The responses of the aggregate M2 are weak or not 
significant with the exception of the Uruguay: we observe a decline of M2 on the impact of the shock 
explained by a monetary substitution process in favour of the dollar deposits not included in M2. In the 
three countries however, the adjustment is fast. And Real Exchange Rates exhibit an over-shooting 
process, appreciating on the impact of the shock, and depreciating later (as expected). The fluctuations 
are of short run duration. 
Overall, responses of domestic variables are weakly significant and produce only short term effects. 
This does not imply that Latin American countries are not influenced by US interest rates. However, 
over the sample period, except 1994-1995 and the period after the second quarter of 2004, the main 
trend has been a US expansive monetary policy. As a result, the size of interest rate shocks looks 
relatively weak over the period.  
Variance decompositions confirm the weak influence of the US interest rate. The innovations of this 
variable explain: 
- the variance of the Argentinean interest rate (as expected for a currency board country) but 
without a persistence effect (15% of the contemporaneous variance; 7.4% at quarter four), 
- the variance of Uruguayan aggregate M2 (9.6% of the contemporaneous variance without 
persistence), 
-  and the variance of the Uruguayan Real Exchange Rate with a strong persistence effect 
(17.1% of the contemporaneous variance; around 15% after). 
 
Domestic Real Shocks 
The responses to domestic supply shocks are of short duration and are weak or not significant, except 
for Brazil,. Moreover, the variance decompositions of the various domestic variables show that the 
innovations on the IPI explain the other variables only for Brazil (but without any long term effect). 
For instance, the innovations on B_IPI (Industrial Production Index of Brazil) explain 15% of the 
contemporaneous price variance… but just 7.6% after four quarters. Other nominal variables weakly 
influenced by B_IPI are interest rates (11.3% and 7.7%) and M2 (9.7% and 8.4%) for the 
contemporaneous and quarter four variances. 
 
Domestic Nominal Shocks 
 
The analysis of variance decompositions allows us to stress the influence of prices in these economies. 
Innovations on prices do not explain the variance of production, but they exert a significant influence 
on other nominal variables. The effect on interest rates is important and persistent (around 30% in 
Argentina after one quarter; between 27 and 38% for Brazil; from 33 to 44% in Uruguay). The 
reaction of the authorities to any pressure on prices rests on the inflationary history of these countries. 
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We also find a significant influence on the monetary aggregates M2 (particularly for Brazil). The 
impact is less important in both dollarized countries (Uruguay and especially Argentina). Innovations 
on prices explain around 25% of the variance of the Real Exchange Rate in Brazil and Uruguay, 
suggesting a limited adjustment of the nominal exchange rate linked to fear of floating. The extreme 
rigidity of the nominal exchange rate under a currency board explains the fact that prices exert a strong 
influence on the Real Exchange Rate in Argentina (more than 55% of its variance). 
The innovations on interest rates are monetary policy shocks.  The adjustments after an interest rate 
shock seem rapid in the three countries: the main part of the adjustment for the set of endogenous 
variable lasts four quarters for Argentina, seven for Brazil and six for Uruguay. Variance 
decompositions suggest that innovations on interest rates are not relevant explicative variables.  
A shock on M2 is interpreted as a nominal demand shock. The monotonous Argentinean money path 
converges smoothly in about six quarters. For Brazil and Uruguay, the path exhibits a negative 
overshooting, and then converges in about three quarters. These schemes can be explained by the 
differences in nominal anchors, linked to the exchange rate regime: in Argentina, the hard peg 
stabilizes money demand (which remains unstable in both the other partners of Mercosur). Innovations 
on M2 induce a very short duration in macroeconomic fluctuations: two quarters in Uruguay, less that 
six in Brazil and six quarters in Argentina. The impact in Argentina is stronger. Variance 
decompositions show that innovations on M2 explain from 16% to 18% of the variance of IPI in 
Argentina, but they do not exert any influence in the two other countries. Innovations on the monetary 
aggregate explain 10% of the variance of Argentinean prices after one year. The variance of interest 
rates in Argentina and Brazil is explained at the level of 12% and 10% respectively after four quarters. 
The long term influence of the interest rate rests on the monetarist approach of the monetary policy in 
the three countries. Indeed, a risk of excessive liquidity is synonymous with monetary tensions. Last, 
innovations on M2 explain between 12 and 10% of the Real Exchange Rate variance in Uruguay. 
A shock on Real Exchange Rate is a depreciation followed by a slight and short re-appreciation, in the 
three countries. The effects on other variables have a short duration, between two and three quarters. 
Variance decompositions confirm this weak influence of the Real Exchange Rate over the sample 
period... But we must remember that during the main part of the period, monetary authorities had 
smoothed its volatility, either because its adoption as “official” nominal anchor, or to avoid “pass 
through” effects (even after the adoption of inflation targeting and flotation regimes).     
 
4. IDENTIFICATION OF COMMON AND COUNTRY SPECIFIC COMPONENTS OF 
STRUCTURAL SHOCKS USING A STATE SPACE MODEL 
 
The main purpose of structural VAR estimation is to obtain non-recursive orthogonalization of the 
error terms for impulse response analysis and variance decompositions of forecast errors. Whatever 
the identification restrictions (short or long run), and their theoretical (or “a-theoretical”) foundations 
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(choice of an “ad-hoc” scheme of identification, or decomposition “ à la Blanchard and Quah” 
contrasting  demand and supply shocks on the basis of long run neutrality on the supply side), these 
experiments don’t allow the distinction between common and specific components of fluctuations and 
shocks. However, this distinction, and the overall weight of the common component, are the 
fundamental criteria of judgment in the choice of economic and monetary integration. Following the 
OCA theory, a too light weight of the common component implies significant adjustment of exchange 
rates in case of strong shocks. Such adjustments are difficult to endure in a simple free trade area; it 
becomes impossible in the case of a  common monetary zone. In short, any integration process implies 
symmetry, i.e. a large common component. 
 
The model 
 
 In order to assess the share of the common and idiosyncratic components in the variability of the 
structural shocks (policy shocks included), we propose a breakdown in two unobservable stochastic 
components using Kalman filter (Harvey, A.C., 1989, Kim., C.J., Nelson, C.R., 1999). The same 
method has been used by Bosco N’Goma (2000) for members of CFA Zone, by N.Chamie, 
A.Desserres, and R.Lalonde, 1994 for a comparison between Europe and USA, or by Lalonde and St-
Amand (1993) for ALENA. We report here an adaptation of the explanations proposed by this set of 
papers. 
The state-space models distinguish observed variables (the “signal” or “observation”) and unobserved 
variables (“state” variables). They are composed of two sets of equations: 
One or several “signal “ (or “measurement”) equations relating the observable variables to the 
unobservable states ;  
One or several “state” (or “transition”) equations describing  how the vector of “states” evolves over 
time. 
In this part, we aim at breaking down shocks affecting jointly the three members of Mercosur - or any 
pair of them – into two unobservable components: a common component for the three countries – or at 
least for two of them- and  an idiosyncratic component, specific for each country. We note : 
the three members by i= A, B and U respectively for Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay ; 
_ ,i j t
ε  the real or nominal shocks, for period « t », with j=IPI, CPI, En, R ; 
{ }
_ ,C j t
n
 the common components ; 
{ }
_ ,i j t
n
 the idiosyncratic components ; 
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_i j
α  and ( )
_
1
i j
α−  the respective weight of common and idiosyncratic components in each 
shock 
_ ,i j t
ε  ; 
The decomposition consists of the estimation of the parameters 
_i j
α  and the time series { }
_ ,C j t
n
 
and { }
_ ,i j t
n
. 
In our state-space model, the following equations: 
( )
( )
( )
_ ,
_ _
_ ,
_ ,
_ , _ _
_ ,
_ ,
_ _
_ ,
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
C j t
A j A j
A j t
A j t
B j t B j B j
B j t
U j t
U j U j
U j t
n
n
n
n
α αε
ε α α
ε α α
 
 
−
 
 
 
 
 
 = −
 
 
 
 
 
  −
 
 
 
 
constitute the  measurement (or transition) system, with the structural innovations – stemming  from 
the decomposition of  our reduced form VAR residuals – as endogenous variables. 
To estimate the parameters 
_i j
α  and the series 
_ ,C j t
n
 and 
_ ,i j t
n
, we need a set of transition 
equations, specifying the dynamics of the unobservable components. For identification purposes, we  
assume that common and specific components are uncorrelated. In a large number of software 
packages – and in particular Eviews 5 and Rats 6, used here – the identifying restrictions assume 
normalized structural innovations
_ ,i j t
ε  , with unit variance. This normalization facilitates the 
comparison of structural shocks, stemming from our different country VARs estimated separately! We 
will also assume unit variance for the unobservable components. While determining the stochastic 
components path through the definition of  their distributions, this assumption defines the transition 
equations. So, we can write as  “state” system: 
_ ,
_ ,
_ ,
_ ,
_ ,
_ ,
_ ,
_ ,
( ) 0 0 0
0 ( ) 0 0
0 0 ( ) 0
0 0 0 ( )
( ) 1
( ) 1
      
( ) 1
( ) 1
C j t
A j t
B j t
U j t
C j t
A j t
B j t
U j t
Var n
Var n
Var n
Var n
Var n
Var n
Var n
Var n
 
 
 Ω =
 
 
 
 
 =

=


=

 =

 
Finally, we must choose a reference country shock to which the other shocks will be compared: we 
will choose Argentina when Argentina is present (and Brazil in the other cases) and start estimation 
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initializing
_
1
i j
α = . The Kalman filter algorithm will be used to decompose the structural shock 
and idiosyncratic and (if they exist) common components.  
We have printed in Appendix 4 the outcomes of our results. Specification tests are derived using a 
maximum likelihood approach (Harvey, A.C., 1989). 
 
Foreign shocks 
 
In all our results, C(1), C(2), and C(3) point out the weight of common components in the structural 
shocks for Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay respectively. Shocks on foreign variables give us an 
assessment of the pertinence of the method. These variables, are present in the three VAR models (and 
thus endogenous). In the Choleski matrix allowing the identification of structural shocks, they are 
ordered as follows (from the least to the most endogenous): World Oil Price (WOP), US Industrial 
Production Index (US_IPI), US interest on the Fed. Funds (US_R). We can assume that the series of 
structural shocks for these foreign variables - deduced from the three equations of the three country 
models - embody a significant common component for the three countries: the origin of these shocks 
is exogenous and common for the domestic block of the three country models! 
In spite of the poor performance of oil price estimation, we can check that the oil price shock common 
in the three systems… is effectively recognized as common by our program! It is a way to check that 
the UCM (Unobservable Component Model) identifies common components. To a lesser degree, it is 
also the case for both the other external variables (US_IPI and US_R) variables. In tables A.4.1., 
A.4.2., and A.4.3., the common component represents between 70 and 80% of the variance for oil 
shock, a little less for both the other shocks.    
We can note also that the score for Brazil is always lower (a confirmation of the larger autonomy of  
the Brazilian economy regarding US conjuncture?)  
 
Domestic shocks 
 
The first shock is represented by the domestic series of structural innovations in the IPI in the three 
VARs. (Table A.4.4). The Argentine cycle is taken as the base (i.e. as the reference for the other 
countries). The Brazilian real cycle is not significantly linked to any common trend, contrary to the 
Uruguayan one. But even in this last case, the weight of the common component is lower that 10%. 
We try to estimate a common component by pairs of countries in Mercosur. The experiment is 
consistent with the previous outcomes: Uruguay probably shares the same proportion of common 
components as in the three country model (even if the test here is less significant), and the Brazilian 
shocks do not share any common component either with Argentina or Uruguay. We got identical 
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results as in the case of PPI shocks, with evidence of a common component between Argentina and 
Uruguay (Table A.4.5.) 
In the case of the other shocks - domestic interest rates, money aggregate, Real Exchange Rates  - we 
did not find any hints of  a common trend (Tables A.4.6, A.4.7, A.4.8.). As the last three shocks 
account more or less for economic policy, it is once more a proof of the lack of coordination between 
the three main partners of Mercosur. In short, these outcomes confirm the conclusions of Eichengreen 
and Taylor (2004) outlining the lack of policy coordination within the Mercosur. The lack of common 
components for M2 also confirm the conclusion of our VAR: the money demand in the three countries 
follows idiosyncratic patterns!  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Following the exogenous approach of OCA, our results converge to indicate that the Mercosur 
countries are not predisposed to form a monetary union either between them, or with the United States. 
May we conclude that in any case, Mercosur may not consider the adoption of a common currency? In 
line with one of our main conclusions stressing the importance of exchange rate regime adjustments in 
the face of macroeconomic shocks, the weak cycle synchronicity demonstrated in this paper is not per 
se an impediment to the formation of a monetary union.  
As stressed by Frankel and Rose(1998), the adoption of a common currency can lead to an 
intensification of bilateral trade which in turn increases cycle synchronicity. This line of argument, as 
shown in numerous empirical papers, rests on the feature of national specialization: cycle 
synchronicity improves in the intra-industry trade case but not in the inter-industry trade one. 
Moreover, empirical studies suggest that the OCA endogeneity is relevant when bilateral trade 
between candidate countries to the currency union is already significant. From these two points, it is 
not the case for Mercosur countries. Then, weak cycle synchronicity – due to the choice of different 
exchange rate regimes - reduces the opportunity of economic policy convergence, even if institutional 
mechanisms exist to promote coordination inside the area. 
At last, thought these results stem from VAR studies including more variables than the majority of 
papers published on the subject, we must interpret with caution these results. On one hand, the period 
of study is relatively short. On the other hand, the strong sensitivity of these countries to international 
capital flows was not explicitly taken into account here. So, a development of this study will a have to 
capture more precisely the financial instability of these countries and its consequences on the relative 
costs and benefits of a monetary union
13
. It is thus advisable to integrate into our analysis EMBI 
                                               
13
. Edwards (2006) uses probit panel regressions to investigate whether countries forming a monetary union have 
a lower occurrence of sudden stop episodes and of current account reversal episodes, and whether they are better 
able to absorb external shocks. His answers are negative: belonging to a currency union has not lowered the 
probability of facing a sudden stop or a current account reversal, and external shocks have been amplified in 
currency union countries. 
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spreads and the implications of dollarization, namely as far as the presence of balance-sheet effects 
following currency depreciations is concerned. 
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Appendix 1 IPI Cross-correlations 
 
Argentina – United States 
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Brazil – United States 
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   US before            US after           lag       lead 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Argentina - Brazil 
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Argentina - Uruguay 
 
Uruguay before  Uruguay after      lag       lead 
 
 
Brazil – Uruguay 
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Appendix 2 Impulse responses 
 
A.2.1. Argentina: Responses to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ±2 S.E. 
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A.2.2. Brazil: Responses to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ±2 S.E. 
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A.2.3. Uruguay: Responses to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ±2 S.E. 
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Appendix 3 Variance Decompositions 
A.3.1. Argentina 
Variance decomposition of A_IPI: 
 Period WOP US_IPI US_R A_IPI A_PPI A_R A_M2 A_ER 
1 3.76 0.02 4.21 92.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4 5.55 0.24 3.63 59.34 5.80 6.89 18.49 0.06 
12 5.45 3.75 4.25 56.21 5.68 6.55 18.04 0.07 
 
Variance decomposition of A_PPI: 
 Period WOP US_IPI US_R A_IPI A_PPI A_R A_M2 A_ER 
1 15.33 0.71 0.32 0.00 83.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4 11.48 4.43 1.53 0.74 58.75 3.56 9.05 10.45 
12 10.57 10.29 1.50 0.79 54.40 3.27 9.59 9.60 
 
Variance decomposition of A_R: 
Period WOP US_IPI US_R A_IPI A_PPI A_R A_M2 A_ER 
1 6.01 0.09 14.93 2.27 16.88 59.83 0.00 0.00 
4 5.02 4.68 7.37 1.74 31.91 31.78 11.60 5.90 
12 4.88 6.82 7.09 2.00 30.62 29.74 13.33 5.53 
 
Variance decomposition of A_M2: 
Period WOP US_IPI US_R A_IPI A_PPI A_R A_M2 A_ER 
1 1.01 2.33 2.46 0.87 11.65 9.67 72.03 0.00 
4 2.32 2.13 3.28 4.15 9.86 8.12 68.90 1.23 
12 2.57 5.48 4.12 4.21 9.69 7.60 65.17 1.15 
 
Variance decomposition of A_ER: 
Period WOP US_IPI US_R A_IPI A_PPI A_R A_M2 A_ER 
1 3.14 3.61 0.83 0.01 68.66 0.01 0.36 23.39 
4 13.79 4.72 1.07 0.57 55.35 4.30 4.37 15.83 
12 13.95 4.77 1.09 0.58 55.21 4.28 4.36 15.76 
 
 
A.3.2. Brazil 
Variance decomposition of B_IPI: 
 Period WOP US_IPI US_R B_IPI B_PPI B_R B_M2 B_ER 
1 5.47 4.72 7.15 82.66 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4 9.48 4.50 6.59 76.06 1.06 0.35 1.59 0.38 
12 9.43 4.93 6.76 74.90 1.11 0.68 1.71 0.49 
 
Variance decomposition of B_PPI: 
Period WOP US_IPI US_R B_IPI B_PPI B_R B_M2 B_ER 
1 3.64 0.03 0.19 14.89 81.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4 2.35 2.27 0.39 7.61 67.80 7.48 2.37 9.72 
12 3.51 5.68 2.34 7.41 59.27 9.48 3.15 9.17 
 
Variance decomposition of B_R: 
Period WOP US_IPI US_R B_IPI B_PPI B_R B_M2 B_ER 
1 0.49 0.05 2.34 11.29 38.82 47.01 0.00 0.00 
4 2.55 1.39 2.56 7.65 30.67 44.48 10.16 0.54 
12 3.69 2.47 2.84 7.57 27.95 44.05 10.55 0.88 
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Variance decomposition of B_M2: 
Period WOP US_IPI US_R B_IPI B_PPI B_R B_M2 B_ER 
1 3.04 1.69 0.06 9.67 45.06 13.49 26.98 0.00 
4 2.75 4.48 0.12 8.40 47.32 12.62 20.98 3.33 
12 3.48 6.33 1.32 8.25 43.66 13.54 19.92 3.50 
 
Variance decomposition of B_ER: 
Period WOP US_IPI US_R B_IPI B_PPI B_R B_M2 B_ER 
1 2.34 0.20 0.00 5.15 23.17 6.85 2.10 60.19 
4 1.92 1.50 0.08 7.51 29.37 6.67 3.52 49.45 
12 2.08 2.09 0.40 7.44 28.83 6.96 3.65 48.54 
 
 
A.3.3 Uruguay 
Variance decomposition of U_IPI: 
 Period WOP US_IPI US_R U_IPI U_PPI U_R U_M2 U_ER 
1 0.32 4.18 1.13 94.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4 0.43 4.41 2.39 83.22 3.66 0.14 2.88 2.88 
12 0.43 5.54 2.80 81.74 3.64 0.16 2.84 2.84 
 
Variance decomposition of U_PPI: 
Period WOP US_IPI US_R U_IPI U_PPI U_R U_M2 U_ER 
1 0.97 2.48 0.01 0.56 95.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4 1.04 7.68 0.35 1.10 84.41 2.71 0.07 2.64 
12 1.24 12.48 0.61 1.22 78.64 3.28 0.07 2.46 
 
Variance decomposition of U_R: 
Period WOP US_IPI US_R U_IPI U_PPI U_R U_M2 U_ER 
1 1.07 7.35 1.39 0.67 44.65 44.87 0.00 0.00 
4 0.77 24.54 1.47 0.76 40.85 28.56 0.04 3.01 
12 0.93 35.39 3.06 1.03 33.01 24.09 0.06 2.42 
 
 
Variance decomposition of U_M2: 
Period WOP US_IPI US_R U_IPI U_PPI U_R U_M2 U_ER 
1 2.68 5.57 9.63 0.00 15.36 3.42 63.33 0.00 
4 2.09 9.98 7.65 2.09 27.66 3.67 45.98 0.88 
12 1.97 16.19 7.96 2.07 25.31 3.88 41.81 0.81 
 
Variance decomposition of U_ER: 
Period WOP US_IPI US_R U_IPI U_PPI U_R U_M2 U_ER 
1 9.38 0.00 17.12 8.05 5.09 0.27 11.88 48.20 
4 6.99 0.85 15.33 7.21 21.96 1.98 9.37 36.31 
12 6.93 1.30 15.48 7.13 21.99 1.97 9.28 35.92 
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Appendix 4 Unobservable Components Models Estimations 
Foreign Variables Shocks: Impact on the three economies 
 
A4.1. Oil Prices 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) 0.819431 0.016923 48.42136 0.0000 
C(2) 0.686534 0.019256 35.65248 0.0000 
C(3) 0.823999 0.027538 29.92181 0.0000 
 
A.4.2. US IPI 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) 0.724298 0.032420 22.34090 0.0000 
C(2) 0.623213 0.029792 20.91877 0.0000 
C(3) 0.680470 0.030621 22.22210 0.0000 
 
A.4.3. US Federal Funds Rates 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) 0.713784 0.047974 14.87868 0.0000 
C(2) 0.515605 0.016995 30.33916 0.0000 
C(3) 0.621358 0.031831 19.52076 0.0000 
 
 
Domestic Variables Shocks: 
 
In all our results. C(1), C(2), and C(3) point out the weight of common component in the structural 
shocks for Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay respectively. The reference country is defined as the country 
of which the cycle has a dominant weight during the attribution of the values of initialization. When 
Argentina is present, it is chosen as country of reference to the cycle of which are compared the other 
cycles. Otherwise, the reference country is Brazil. This choice is arbitrary, but it does not modify the 
results. In particular, it does not hide the presence of a common component when there is such 
component. 
 
A.4.4. Domestic IPI 
 
Three Countries 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) 0.988419 0.075659 13.06418 0.0000 
C(2) 0.062053 0.066537 0.932605 0.3510 
C(3) 0.089826 0.052552 1.709269 0.0874 
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Argentina - Brazil 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) 0.996318 0.075475 13.20067 0.0000 
C(2) 0.061896 0.066450 0.931472 0.3516 
 
Argentina - Uruguay 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) 0.992016 0.072712 13.64311 0.0000 
C(3) 0.089716 0.052350 1.713791 0.0866 
 
Brazil - Uruguay 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C(2) 0.999858 0.082655 12.09675 0.0000 
C(3) -0.011601 0.066542 -0.174339 0.8616 
 
A.4.5. Domestic PPI 
 
Three Countries 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) 0.986720 0.038162 25.85603 0.0000 
C(2) 0.060653 0.056806 1.067715 0.2856 
C(3) 0.099918 0.039829 2.508659 0.0121 
 
Argentina - Brazil  
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) 0.996488 0.039015 25.54144 0.0000 
C(2) 0.060459 0.056643 1.067373 0.2858 
 
Argentina - Uruguay 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) 0.990184 0.035279 28.06742 0.0000 
C(3) 0.099788 0.039647 2.516874 0.0118 
 
Brazil - Uruguay 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C(2) 0.998744 0.087787 11.37696 0.0000 
C(3) -0.034753 0.049299 -0.704946 0.4808 
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A.4.6. Domestic Interest Rates 
 
Three Countries 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) 0.998135 0.058554 17.04639 0.0000 
C(2) 0.031792 0.070349 0.451915 0.6513 
C(3) 0.029897 0.061313 0.487616 0.6258 
 
Argentina – Brazil 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) 0.999029 0.057348 17.42039 0.0000 
C(2) 0.031783 0.069328 0.458445 0.6466 
 
Argentina-Uruguay 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) 0.999101 0.057251 17.45115 0.0000 
C(3) 0.029889 0.060465 0.494313 0.6211 
 
Brazil - Uruguay 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C(2) 0.995383 0.060596 16.42666 0.0000 
C(3) 0.067176 0.048546 1.383755 0.1664 
 
 
A.4.7. Domestic Monetary Aggregates 
 
Three Countries 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) 0.996839 0.081676 12.20484 0.0000 
C(2) 0.013360 0.112377 0.118888 0.9054 
C(3) 0.054749 0.090159 0.607243 0.5437 
 
Argentina - Brazil 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) 0.999819 0.082357 12.14010 0.0000 
C(2) 0.013348 0.112580 0.118566 0.9056 
 
Argentina - Uruguay 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) 0.997006 0.048762 20.44652 0.0000 
C(3) 0.054746 0.090161 0.607206 0.5437 
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Brazil - Uruguay 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C(2) 0.998854 0.112688 8.863914 0.0000 
C(3) -0.033048 0.076812 -0.430248 0.6670 
 
A.4.8. Real Exchange Rates 
Three Countries 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) 0.998111 0.098674 10.11523 0.0000 
C(2) 0.018343 0.057335 0.319934 0.7490 
C(3) 0.039594 0.070296 0.563239 0.5733 
 
Argentina - Brazil 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) 0.999676 0.098761 10.12216 0.0000 
C(2) 0.018334 0.057094 0.321123 0.7481 
 
Argentina - Uruguay 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C(1) 0.998435 0.097671 10.22239 0.0000 
C(3) 0.039590 0.069968 0.565824 0.5715 
 
Brazil - Uruguay 
 Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C(2) 0.997283 0.063833 15.62330 0.0000 
C(3) 0.052956 0.055387 0.956107 0.3390 
 
 
 
